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RUSSIA'S WORLD OUTLOOK AFFECTED BY EXPERIENCE WITH UNRRA

THE opening of the Russian winter offensive through Poland—cynically discounted in advance by critics of the U.S.S.R.—brings once more into focus Russia's relations with its Western allies. Today some Americans want to know why the United States, before extending lend-lease aid to Moscow, did not exact a promise from Stalin that he would deal with the small nations of Eastern Europe in accordance with our ideas on the subject. This is a tantalizing historical hypothesis, but it only shows how short our memory is apt to be.

EXTREMES OF VIEWS ON RUSSIA. When Germany invaded Russia on June 22, 1941 it was a day of unalloyed relief for Britain, which up to that time (and this, too, we are beginning to forget) had been fighting Germany alone for over a year. Britain's struggle had provoked our warmest admiration and had caused us to give the British lend-lease aid, but had not brought us actively into the war. For the United States, Russia's participation in the war held the promise that beleaguered Britain would not succumb to Germany. If there was anything we felt like asking of Russia at that time, it was that it should keep on fighting.

When we first extended lend-lease aid to Russia on October 30, 1941, the Germans were at the gates of Moscow. We were then hardly in a position, even had we wanted to, to impose terms on Stalin. We, and the British, breathed a sigh of relief when the Germans began to retreat. Our materials were just beginning to trickle into Russia when the siege of Stalingrad was lifted in 1942. We applauded every subsequent Russian advance. Yet when Moscow pressed for the opening of a second front in Europe, many Americans thought the Russians uncouth in their blunt demands. When the Russians approached the borders of countries conquered by Germany, which Russia alone was in a geographic and military position to liberate, doubts and suspicions began to be

voiced about the possible effects of Russian victories and Moscow's ultimate purposes in Europe. Nazism had not yet been defeated. Yet already many people, some of whom had whole-heartedly favored appeasement of Germany, had begun to predict a war between the Western allies and Russia—only to ask peremptorily, following our own setbacks in Western Europe, why the Russians were so slow about opening a front in Poland to relieve German pressure on our forces.

These doubts and suspicions have not been allayed by Russia's participation in one international conference after another—from the food conference at Hot Springs to the security conference at Dumbarton Oaks. If the Russians attend, its critics fear Moscow is trying to bore from within. If they absent themselves, as they did in the case of the Chicago Aviation Conference, it is assumed that they must be nurturing sinister designs against the West.

What is the answer to all the riddles about Russia that are being propounded at this time? The Russians certainly are not saints, as some early Western discoverers of the Soviet system had, in an excess of ill-informed zeal, sometimes proclaimed. But neither are they satanic supermen. Even in the Kremlin there are divergences of views about the foreign policy Russia should pursue at this moment, one of the most critical and decisive in human history. Even in that outwardly regimented country there are some who place the accent on nationalism and isolationism, and others who favor international cooperation.

UNRRA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA. Russia's decision, like our own, will not be reached in a vacuum. It will be affected by a shrewd estimate of the attitude other countries may be expected to assume toward Russia—not now, when the United Nations need Russia's military might both in Europe and Asia, but after the war, when this need may have disappeared. In particular, Moscow's policy on

the all-important issue of collective security will be determined by its experience in international organizations that are already functioning.

It is all the more unfortunate, under the circumstances, that Russia's experience with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has not proved encouraging. Many factors can be adduced to explain the situation. UNRRA itself, built among high hopes that the need of some peoples for relief and the humanitarian urge of others to relieve them would be powerful stimulants to cooperation between nations, has so far found it impossible to get much beyond the blueprint stage. Ships and supplies, urgently needed for the prosecution of the war, are hard to get. Most of the areas in acute need of relief are still in the active zone of military operations, and there the Army is in full control. UNRRA representatives, who had just begun to distribute relief in Greece, had to be withdrawn when civil strife interrupted their activities. In Poland, once more a theatre of war, the work of UNRRA is threatened by the conflict of authority between the Polish government-in-exile and the Lublin Committee recognized by Russia as the Provisional Government of Poland.

CAN UNRRA STALEMATE BE BROKEN? Every one acquainted with former Governor Herbert H. Lehman, Director General of UNRRA, will testify to his humanitarian ideals and his desire to make the international organization he heads fulfill its high mission. But no one concerned with the fate of the conquered peoples, and with the future of international organization, can view with equanimity the stalemate UNRRA appears to have reached, notably in its relations with Russia. And part, at least, of the responsibility for this stalemate must

be laid at the door of UNRRA. On its staff are many men and women inspired by ideals and possessing valuable technical skills. But it also numbers, in key policy-making positions, Americans who, possessing no knowledge of international affairs, no experience in negotiations with foreign nations, have brought about a situation in which the Russian members of the organization find themselves sidetracked, shorn of authority, frustrated and thwarted at every turn. (The same thing, it should be added, is true of other non-Americans in UNRRA.) Russia is in need of relief for its liberated areas. Relief, too, is needed for the areas of Poland and Czechoslovakia freed by the Russians. It is true that the Russians are not always easy to deal with. But the anti-Russian bias revealed by some of the American officials of the organization only serves to reinforce Russia's suspicions, carried over from the last war, that relief may come to be used as a political weapon. The result is that the Russians are relying on their own efforts, however limited, for such relief as they can give the people of their liberated areas.

It is international organization, not Russia, that stands to lose most by the inadequacies of UNRRA. Machinery of international cooperation is only as good as the people who make it work. UNRRA, if left in the hands of political opportunists concerned primarily with personal power, could become a tragic warning against international organization. If well-administered by people experienced both in relief and in the problems of other countries, it could still become a steppingstone toward cooperation among nations in the wider field of collective security, in which the United States needs Russia as much as Russia needs us.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

MacARTHUR CAMPAIGN PROMISES EARLY INDEPENDENCE FOR FILIPINOS

American naval and air superiority has made possible General MacArthur's Philippine operations and is essential to their ultimate success. Assuming that this superiority is maintained, liberation of the Philippines seems a foregone conclusion. This liberation would cut the Japanese empire in two, depriving Japan of oil, rubber and other vital supplies from the Dutch and British Indies.

A thorough student of military history like General MacArthur is doubtless fully aware of his debt to sea power, although he has not stressed it in his communiqués. His unhackneyed strategy and his employment of the element of surprise have proved brilliantly effective against an enemy who plans meticulously but has never shown aptitude for dealing with unforeseen situations. General MacArthur also may recall Frederick the Great's remark that it is easier to make war in one's own country, where every citizen is a guerrilla or an intelligence agent, than in that of the enemy. This is approximately the

situation in the Philippines today, and has been in some parts of the islands ever since Pearl Harbor.

JAPAN FAILS TO CONQUER FILIPINOS. For security reasons, the full story of Filipino resistance during Japanese occupation is not yet available. It may be said, however, that more than half the archipelago was never subject to Japanese rule; that some guerrillas carried on regular governments, even maintaining a postal system; and that Japanese efforts to build an auxiliary army from the old Philippine constabulary failed completely. Many months ago radio contact was established by General MacArthur and the Commonwealth government-in-exile with resistance groups. The futile and sometimes harmful short-wave broadcasts from America, which had promised aid "within six months," were succeeded by realistic military and political directions from General MacArthur, the late President Quezon, President Osmeña, and Brigadier General Carlos Romulo.

Japanese attempts to influence the people by propaganda, by the use of Japanese "Catholics" from the army's religious section, by lessons in the Japanese language, and by the *Kalibapi* (local spies) and neighborhood groups, were largely nullified by brutal military measures, personal indignities such as slapping Filipinos in the face, food shortages, measures to deprive the *taos* of their cherished bolos, and efforts to indoctrinate a Malayan people with the bleak code which Japanese militarists profess and often practice. An amusing sidelight on their attempts to popularize the "co-prosperity sphere" is the fact that in Tagalog "co" means "my," which was apparently overlooked by the earnest propagandists from Tokyo. It is safe to assume that, except for a few paid spies and a handful of genuine "Pan-Asiatics," Filipino cooperation with our forces will be complete.

The collaborationist problem is also unlikely to prove difficult by comparison with similar problems in Europe. There are no ideological differences among Filipinos, with the attendant bitterness which divides right and left wing groups elsewhere. Although nearly a thousand important officials of President Osmeña's party, the *Nacionalista*, have held office under the Japanese, the great majority are believed to have been out of sympathy with their conquerors. Many have kept in touch with the guerrillas; some were designated for that purpose by the Commonwealth government before the fall of Corregidor. Tension developed on Leyte after the Americans landed, when guerrilla leaders sought the punishment of alleged collaborationists, and President Osmeña's plan for a commission to examine these cases was suspended. General MacArthur apparently cut the Gordian knot by proclaiming on December 30 that he would hold collaborationists in military confinement for the duration of the war, and then turn them over to the Philippine government for trial. This delay, which will give time for passions to subside, undoubtedly had the willing approval of

President Osmeña. As this will protect collaborationists from any immediate reprisals, it will not be surprising to see many of them—including members of José Laurel's puppet cabinet—seeking sanctuary behind the American lines as soon as they can elude their Japanese masters.

ISLANDS' ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. Economic problems would seem to be more important than political issues. President Osmeña, who has just returned to Washington, has intimated that he will seek a free trade treaty with America as soon as the Tydings Act expires in 1946, or before. Immediate shortages, however, are acute and will be more so—a mass evacuation of Manila is already reported underway because of food scarcity. With inter-island transportation almost nonexistent and land traffic disorganized, relief may prove a heavy burden on overtaxed American shipping. Yet, as most Filipinos live on the land, widespread famine conditions need not be anticipated.

The announced policy of the American government is to turn over administration of liberated areas to the Commonwealth as soon as the military situation permits. A recent suggestion of President Osmeña that complete independence be granted, if militarily feasible, by November 1945, would appear desirable from several points of view. Provision already has been made by Congressional resolutions of June 30, 1944 for advancing independence from the previously determined date of 1946, and for the acquisition of land, sea and air bases by the United States. The Philippine Congress extant when Japan invaded the islands would still be legally able to function. More important than this, however, an early grant of independence would be a formal acknowledgment of the loyal support the Filipino people have given the United States, despite dangers and disillusionments, throughout the war. This relationship has had few, if any, parallels in the history of colonial government, and its culmination in independence would have a profound effect among Asiatic peoples who may still be subject to Japanese rule.

WALTER WILGUS

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
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Washington News Letter



VANDENBERG CALLS FOR LASTING MILITARY COMMITMENTS

The notable address on foreign affairs which Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, made in the Senate on January 10 has a dual political character. Senator Vandenberg points out the inescapable need for international collaboration when he says: "I do not believe that any nation hereafter can immunize itself by its own exclusive action." At the same time his statement, valuable today, may prove harmful tomorrow, for it contains a list of difficult conditions which Senator Vandenberg would require our allies to accept as the price of treaty association with them. Those conditions could, under adverse circumstances, become the modern counterpart of the reservations with which Senator Henry Cabot Lodge prevented acceptance of the League of Nations Covenant by this country in 1919.

USEFUL EFFECTS OF ADDRESS. Prevailing opinion in Washington, however, is that the current good outweighs the possible ill effects of Vandenberg's address. Through its tolerant understanding of world problems and its restatement of American idealism, it can strengthen President Roosevelt in the conference he is expected to have with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin after Inauguration Day. By drawing attention to the primary security interests of our allies—the elimination of any future military threat from Germany and Japan—Vandenberg has demonstrated to the other United Nations that there are influential persons in the United States outside the Administration who understand their problems.

The address marks a further step toward that cooperation of Republicans and Democrats on issues of foreign policy which cautiously began to develop last summer through talks between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and John Foster Dulles, foreign affairs adviser to Governor Thomas E. Dewey. The outstanding accomplishment of this cooperation was to temper irritation in the United States over the unilateral actions of Britain and Russia in Europe, and to redefine the meaning of the war in the idealistic terms used in earlier years by the Administration.

For these various reasons President Roosevelt dissuaded Democratic Congressional leaders from criticizing the address, although their reluctance to let a Republican score a triumph and their doubts about the value of some of Vandenberg's proposals caused them at first to consider a deprecating reply. At the same time the President discouraged the holding of

a debate on the good points made by Vandenberg, one of which Mr. Roosevelt has shown no intention of heeding until after the meeting of the three heads of state. Vandenberg urged that the President "speak out" in public to our people and our allies on foreign policy. The President's view is reported to be that anything official said now might disturb the outlook for a successful Big-Three meeting. His Inaugural Address on January 20 will show whether he has revised this view.

DEMILITARIZATION TREATY PLAN. The Vandenberg address contained not only a message but a plan. The prospects for political realization of the plan as Vandenberg presented it are slight, because with it he associated conditions that might make collective peace-making impossible. The Senator urged that the "major allies" agree to a "hard and fast treaty" to keep Germany and Japan "permanently demilitarized." But, in return, he wants an agreement from Britain and Russia that they will submit for review to the security organization, not yet established, the unilateral frontier settlements (Poland), and the bilateral security agreements (between Russia and Britain, Russia and Czechoslovakia, Russia and France) that European powers have made during the war. There is no indication here that our allies will agree to this bargain. Britain has apprehensions about this country's post-war economic policy, France remains cool toward the United States, and Russia still doubts our intention to embrace effective collective security. The conditions proposed by Senator Vandenberg mix the German and Japanese problems with the larger problem of future world security.

Vandenberg weakened his plan by expressing doubts about the likelihood that the United States would become an active participant in an international security organization. Moreover, he still opposes granting the American delegate to an international organization the right to order the use of American troops without previous consultation with Congress—a proviso that would greatly reduce the efficacy of the Security Council proposed at Dumbarton Oaks. Since a German demilitarization treaty, however, would bring the allies more closely together, both now and after the war, it is considered possible here that some such agreement might be reached, but without the conditions suggested by Vandenberg.

BLAIR BOLLES

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